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The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five




To those who support traditional bankruptcy policies, or even who sim-
ply appreciate good statutory drafting, the Bankruptcy Code looks better
than expected on its twenty-fifth birthday. Some post-1978 amendments
have marred its elegance,' but the Code thus far has escaped unscathed from
the four-hundred-and-ninety-one page omnibus bankruptcy bill pending in
Congress.
2
Had the omnibus bill become law, Congress would have left bankruptcy
experts with a larger Code to celebrate, but with little enthusiasm for the
celebration. Unlike the years preceding enactment of the Bankruptcy Code,
members of Congress now hesitate-and may well refuse-to fix even typo-
graphical errors at the request of bankruptcy experts. 3 These days, many
*Associate Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I thank Jill Family,
Elizabeth Gibson and Mark Weidemaier for helpful comments on an earlier draft, Tina Brown for research
assistance, and the University of North Carolina School of Law for summer research support.
1Many post-1978 amendments were fairly narrow special interest exceptions that were not particu-
larly well integrated into the structure of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces & David Frisch,
On the UCC Revision Process: A Reply to Dean Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217, 1238 (1996)
(identifying examples principally from the early 1980s and thereafter); Nancy Blodgett, Bad Law? Brick-
bats for Bankruptcy Code, 70 A.B.A. J. 28 (1984) (quoting Prof. Lawrence P. King criticizing 1984 amend-
ments as special interest legislation not driven by public policy); Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism's Failures: A
Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 887, 900 n.46 (2000) ("In contrast, the many
amendments to the Code since 1978 can often be fairly characterized as patchwork, ill thoughtthrough, or
special interest legislation insensitive to the overall structure of the Code and bankruptcy policy."); David
G. Epstein & Steve H. Nickles, The National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Section 365 Recommenda-
tions and the "Larger Conceptual Issues," 102 DICK. L. REV. 679, 698 (1998) ('To date, Congress seems to
have avoided any reconsideration of the larger conceptual issues of section 365 by enacting special interest
legislation.").
2The latest version is the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, S.
1920 108th Cong. (2004), which is 491 pages in the Government Printing Office edition. Earlier versions
have been of varying lengths, but all would add substantially to the size and complexity of the Bankruptcy
Code. For a detailed history recounting legislative events from the mid-1990s through the present, see
Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation through the News Media, 42 Hous. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2004). See also Robert J. Landry III, The Policy and Forces behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform:
A Classic Battle over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 509 (2003).
'See infra text accompanying notes 18-30.
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members of Congress consider bankruptcy professionals part of the problem,
not the solution. 4 In addition, if its indifference to Chapter 12's repeated
expiration is any indication, Congress is not actively concerned about the
functioning of the system and deals negotiated in its shadow.5 Bankruptcy
experts are not of one mind about most issues, but they collectively have
reason to harbor serious concerns about the future of Code-based bankruptcy
lawmaking.
Even if Congress had a different attitude,6 Bankruptcy Code amendment
would be an imperfect and incomplete mechanism for system improvement.
Overzealous pursuit of legislative solutions to past problems limits flexibility
and will not necessarily address the problems of the future.7 Furthermore,
aspects of the federal legislative process may not be well suited to some of the
oft-cited substantive goals of bankruptcy, such as equal treatment of simi-
larly-situated creditors.8 Also, the Code cannot be equipped to solve many of
the problems that it confronts, such as overwhelming medical debt.9 Finally,
Congress does not have unfettered power to enact bankruptcy legislation
4Senator Grassley, one of the leading sponsors, set the tone. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REc. S10695 (1998)
(Statement of Sen. Grassley) ("Many lawyers who specialize in bankruptcy view bankruptcy as an oppor-
tunity to make big money for themselves. This profit motive causes bankruptcy lawyers to promote
bankruptcy as the only option, even when a financially troubled client might obviously have the ability to
repay some debt. This profit motive creates a real conflict of interest where bankruptcy lawyers push
people into bankruptcy who do not belong there and they do it because they get paid up front."); 144
CONG. REC. S10649 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("bankruptcy lawyers push people into bank-
ruptcy who don't belong there simply because they want to make a quick buck .... I think there is a
widespread recognition that bankruptcy lawyers are preying on unsophisticated consumers .... It is not
surprising that bankruptcy lawyers are leading the charge against this bankruptcy reform legislation ... I
think it is outrageous, Mr. President, that bankruptcy lawyers are helping deadbeats to cheat to force
spouses out of alimony and to cheat children out of child support .... The integrity of the bankruptcy
system depends in part on the honesty and the competence of bankruptcy lawyers.").
'See infra text accompanying notes 31-54.
6Congress of course is not a single being capable of having an attitude, but I am not the first to
anthropomorphize this legislative body. See William W. Buzbee, The One Congress Fiction in Statutory
Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 180 (2000).
7See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the
Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 173 (2000). Provisions like § 524(g) (the Johns-Manville amendments) would fit this description. See
11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
'See Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of Legislative
Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 870-871 (1997) (concluding that
statutory bankruptcy laws are "unstable solutions- to financial common pool problems). Cf Edward J.
Janger, The Locus of Lawmaking: Uniform State Law, Federal Law, and Bankruptcy Reform, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 97, 113 (2000) (observing that the federal lawmaking process is "not pretty," but it may be
better than alternatives). See also Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REV. 819,
845-851 (2002) (noting difficulty of actually achieving intended result through legislation); Adam J.
Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2003) (evaluating the "cognitive frailties" of
various types of lawmakers).
9See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient: In Search of Non-Debt Alternatives, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
453 (2004).
NEXT GENERATION OF LAWMAKING
because the Constitution limits Congressional authorization. 10
These principles and Congress's posture toward bankruptcy should re,
mind experts to embrace a more complex picture of system development. Af-
ter all, not only does the bankruptcy system have many attributes that the
Code simply cannot explain, but the system has evolved substantially over
the last twenty-five years even as the Code has remained relatively con-
stant."' In other words, myriad factors contribute to the bankruptcy sys-
tem. 12 The Code is but one.
As a consequence, Congress has the power to exclude bankruptcy experts
from Code deliberations but not from system reform. 13 Bankruptcy profes-
sionals help change the system even as they engage in case-specific negotia-
tions and transactions. 14 Bankruptcy experts also participate in system
change through the appellate process (whether or not they represent parties
in interest in those cases),' 5 state legislatures, 16 and even the media, other-
wise known as the fourth branch of government.' 7 This Article briefly ex-
plores the limits of Bankruptcy Code-based lawmaking and these other
avenues of reform.
I. CONGRESS, EXPERTS, AND BANKRUPTCY
I'd like to say, just from a personal perspective, I no longer
feel that it's even worth the effort to try and ask Congress
to make a reform that should, by and large, be largely non-
controversial. There are a number of those reforms I think
all of us would agree on, but you don't see anything going to
Congress or through Congress in that manner .... frankly, I
don't care to work with Congress anymore.' 8
"See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1063, 1068 (2002).
"See infra text accompanying notes 64-83.
l"See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 521 (1997).
"I use the term -reform" far more broadly in this Article, than, for example, Black's Law Dictionary,
which not only offers a definition of "law reform," but refers to bankruptcy in it: -The process of, or a
movement dedicated to, streamlining, modernizing, or otherwise improving a body of law generally or the
code governing a particular branch of the law; specif., the investigation and discussion of the law on a topic
(e.g., bankruptcy), usu. by a commission or expert committee, with the goal of formulating proposals for
change to improve the operation of the law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 904 (8th ed. 2004). In my
conception, system reform can and does happen incrementally.
14See infra text accompanying notes 75-85.
"See infra text accompanying notes 92-105.
6See infra text accompanying notes 106-13.
1"See DOUGLASS CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1959). See generally infra text
accompanying notes 114-18.
"Roundtable Discussion, Bankruptcy Reform: Then and Now, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 299, 327
(2004) (statement of Gerald Smith).
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Most members of Congress do not listen to bankruptcy experts today. 19
Not only may some be more receptive to the views of larger monetary con-
tributors,20 but some managers of bankruptcy legislation are affirmatively dis-
trustful of people who make their living principally through the bankruptcy
system.21 According to Senator Grassley, a principal sponsor of.the omnibus
bill, bankruptcy professionals are among a 'tiny handful of fringe radicals"
trying to derail a good bipartisan bill for their own gain. 22 This is a stark
change from a time when bankruptcy professionals were intensively involved
in the shaping of legislation, particularly at the inception of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code.
2 3
The shift in receptiveness to bankruptcy experts has revealed itself in
'9Even the Los Angeles Times editorial page knows this. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Non-Reform, L.A.
TIMES, June 8, 1998, at B4 ('Bankruptcy judges, legal scholars and consumer groups are raising objections,
yet Congress seems intent on ramming through frightfully flawed and sweeping changes in the complex
law of bankruptcy. Virtually none of the recommendations from the 1997 congressional National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission are included.").
2°See, e.g., Robert J. Landry III, The Policy and Forces behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A Classic
Battle over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 509, 521-523 (2003); Stephen Nunez & Howard
Rosenthal, Bankruptcy Reform in Congress: Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Pro-
cess, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 527 (2004). See generally Thomas Stratman, Can Special Interests Buy Con'
gressional Votes? Evidence From Financial Services Legislation, 45 J.L. & ECON. 345 (2002) ('The results
in this paper support the hypothesis that interest groups "buy" legislators' votes with PAC contributions.
The findings show that contributions are most effective in swinging the vote of more junior legislators.").
"iSee, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S 11561 (1999) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (endorsing letter attributing lawyer
criticisms of bill as money driven); 144. CONG. REC. S 10649 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("Bank,
ruptcy lawyers are the fuel which makes the engines of the bankruptcy mills run. It is not surprising that
bankruptcy lawyers are leading the charge against this bankruptcy reform legislation"); Rep. Bill McCol,
un, Bankruptcy Reform: A Return to Responsibility, THE HILL, May 20, 1998, at 38 (describing a "cam-
paign of false information being disseminated by bankruptcy attorneys, bankruptcy 'experts,' and other
people maligning the legislation to further their agendas. However, after subjecting the multitude of half-
truths and false statements disseminated by the critics ... to the light of day, they just don't stand up.").
Bankruptcy lawyers would find work even if the bankruptcy system disappeared completely, of course.
Individuals and firms would still have to work out disputes and financial problems. However, the percep-
tion is that bankruptcy lawyers have a vested interest in the status quo. See Tom Hamburger, Auto Firms
See Profit in Bankruptcy-Reform Bill Provision, WALL ST. J., March 13, 2001, at A28 (industry lobbyist
saying bankruptcy establishment likes bankruptcy system how it has been running it); Jacob M. Schles-
inger, Card Games: As Bankruptcies Surge, Creditors Lobby Hard To Get Tougher Laws, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 1998, at Al (citing lobbyist saying bankruptcy establishment simply prefers status quo).
"5The full quote from Senator Grassley's floor statement is: "The tiny handful of fringe radicals who
oppose bankruptcy reform have waged a disinformation campaign worthy of a soviet commissar." Press
Release, Floor Statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa, Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts, Bankruptcy Reform (June 20, 2000) (on file with author).
3See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
(2001); Jeb Barnes, Bankrupt Bargain? Bankruptcy Reform and the Politics of Adversarial Legalism, 13 J. L.
& POL. 893 (1997); Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, Professionals in Systemic Reform of
Bankruptcy Law: The 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the English Insolvency Act 1986, 74 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 35, 36 (2000) (arguing that bankruptcy professionals played an "exceptional role" in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978); Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96
MICH. L. REV. 47, 94-108 (1997); Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of Bankruptcy Reform, 37
OScOODE HALL L.J. 189 (1999).
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multiple ways. Congress embraced only small portions of the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission's report,24 which relied heavily on the input of
bankruptcy experts. Then, preempting the Commission's report, Congress
introduced and nearly passed detailed and complex omnibus legislation that
would restrict the discretion of courts and lawyers.25 Congress generally did
not respond to the reams of paper documenting problems-typographical,
grammatical, procedural, technical, substantive, policy, and theoretical-with
this bill. 26 Congress did not take heed even of organizations that generally
represented creditor interests, such as the Commercial Law League, 27 of
claims that the legislation would have the opposite effect of that it suppos-
edly intended, 28 or of claims of separate unintended consequences.
29
Based on these types of experiences, it is difficult to imagine that Con-
gress will be particularly receptive to bankruptcy experts' affirmative re-
quests for legislation in the near future. Consider a possible so-called critical
24For examples of Commission proposals that found their way into the omnibus bill, see Melissa B.
Jacoby, Generosity versus Accessibility: Bankruptcy, Consumer Credit, and Health Care Finance in the US,
in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 283 n.77 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesildinen, lain Ramsay,
William C. Whitford, eds., 2003).
2"See generally Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2001). During this period, Congress also separately enacted provisions to
insulate religious contributions made by personal bankruptcy filers, with scant opposition from creditor
representatives. See generally John J. Dyer & Gregory Todd Jones, Judicial Treatment of Charitable Dona-
tions in Bankruptcy Before and After the Religious Liberty and Charitable Contribution Protection Act of
1998, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 265 (2004); Steven Walt, Collective Inaction and Investment: The
Political Economy of Delay in Bankruptcy Reform, 49 EMORY LJ. 1211 (2000).
"6See William T. Bodoh & Lawrence P. Dempsey, Bankruptcy Reform: An Orderly Development of
Public Policy?, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 191 (2001); Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law:
Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 560 (2001); Ann Morales Olazdbal, Con-
sumer Bankruptcy Reform and 11 U.S.C. § 707(b): A Case-Based Analysis, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 317
(2003); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States? 18 BANKR. DEV. J.
1 (2001); Catherine E. Vance & Paige Barr, The Facts & Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL BUS. &
COM. L. J. 361 (2003).
"7Copies of testimony and position papers available at http://www.cllabankruptcy.org/bankruptcy/
specialjlegislativeedition.htm#5.
"See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, The Real Bankruptcy Bill, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 2003, at 42; Hank Hilde-
brand, Survey Shows Big Impact of Anti-Lienstripping Provision in S. 625 (May 27, 1999) (on file with
author) (finding that bill would produce reduction in unsecured creditor returns and would render some
existing plans unconfirmable). For a critique of this approach to commenting on legislation, see Robert A.
Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REV. 819, 852 (2002) (noting that "backfire rhetoric
tends to create an atmosphere that is not conducive to serious and objective consideration of important
issues," although using different types of examples, such as backfire arguments used to defeat consumer
protection legislation).
'9See, e.g., Pamela Kohlman Webster, The Malpractice of Health Care Bankruptcy Reform, 32 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1999) (explaining that health care provisions in omnibus bill are poorly drafted
and would result in "serious unintended consequences"). Of course, the 1978 Code itself had unintended
consequences, see Lissa Lamkin Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Im-
pact of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DUKE L. J. 78, 99 n.101 (1987), as do other laws. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Borden, PSLRA, SLUSA, and Variable Annuities: Overlooked Side Effects of a Potent Legisla-
tive Medicine, 55 MERCER L. REV. 681 (2004).
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vendor or employee amendment as an example. Even in the unlikely event
that everyone agreed on whether the Code should permit, prohibit, or condi-
tion the ability of a debtor-in-possession to pay the pre-petition claims of
employees or vendors early in a business bankruptcy case,30 dare anyone
broach Congress with a proposed amendment? Would lawmakers allow
bankruptcy experts to help draft it well? What kind of efforts would be
required to give Congress sufficient incentive to act on it? Would Congress
insist on carving certain groups out of a general amendment, or tack on multi-
ple unrelated and undesirable provisions? As the quote beginning this section
suggests, many bankruptcy experts are both weary and wary, and, conse-
quently, likely to stay away from Washington, D.C.
Legislators genuinely might be committed to a legal system even if they
chose not to heed the advice of system "insiders." Unfortunately, Congress
has demonstrated some indifference to the system too. Many strong propo-
nents of the omnibus bill seem to be unaware of its contents; for example,
they assert that the bill does not affect bankruptcy filers other than those
with incomes exceeding the national median,31 and yet this limitation applies
to only a tiny fraction of a several-hundred page bill.
32
Congress' handling of Chapter 12 offers an even more demonstrative and
less controversial example. Congress originally enacted Chapter 12 for family
farmers on a trial basis, and that initial trial period expired over a decade
ago. 33 Congress has temporarily reauthorized Chapter 12 ten times. 34 Ac-
"°For a recent court of appeals statement on the issue, see In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir.
2004) (upholding district court decision overturning bankruptcy court authorization of $300 million in
critical vendor payments). Cf In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821 (D. Del. 1999).
"1See, e.g., Press Release, New Democrats Coalition Message of the Week, New Democrats Support
Bankruptcy Reform (February 26, 2001), available at http://www.ndol.org/print.cfm?contentid=3099
("Keep in mind that those earning less than the national median income (about $51,000 for a family of four)
are not affected by this legislation. This bill appropriately targets those who can afford to repay some or
all of their debt."). See also Tom Hamburger, House Legislators Pass Measure to Curb Abuse of Bank-
ruptcy-Protection Laws, WALL ST. J., March 2, 2001, at B2 (Joe Rubin, former Rep. Gekas staffer, now
with U.S. Chamber of Commerce told 'wavering" House members "bill is targeted solely at wealthy
debtors who have abused the bankruptcy system and can afford to repay their debts."); Stephen Labaton,
Promised Veto Appears to Doom Congressional Agreement on Overhauling Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES,
October 13, 2000, at A30 (Rep. Gekas saying "[w]e guarantee a fresh start to any American who needs
it"); Katherine Ackley & Jacob M. Schlesinger, House Panel Approves Bankruptcy-Reforn Bill, WALL ST.
J., April 29, 1999, at B16 (Rep. Gekas saying bill simply requires filers capable of repaying portion of debts
do so).
32See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, S. 1920, 108th Cong.
§§ 102, 318 (2004) (engrossed amendment as agreed to by the House) (providing that median income is
relevant to whether party can move for dismissal or conversion based on abuse, whether new abuse
calculation applies to disposable income test in Chapter 13, and to duration of Chapter 13 plans).
"5See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088.
3 See Family Farm Bankruptcies, Extensions, Pub. L. No. 103-65, 107 Stat. 311 (Aug. 6, 1993); Omni-
bus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
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cording to members' statements, Chapter 12 permanence is not only uncon-
troversial, but desirable.35 In fact, one reasonably can infer that members of
Congress are more comfortable with Chapter 12 than with any other chapter
of the Bankruptcy Code. Yet, Congress so far has not permanently author-
ized Chapter 12; rather, it has let Chapter 12 completely lapse four times,
often for many months.
36
Members of Congress who say they support making Chapter 12 perma-
nent have been open about their interest in tying Chapter 12's fate with the
omnibus bankruptcy bill, which itself addresses Chapter 12. 37 Representa-
2681-610 (Oct. 21, 1998); Bankruptcy: Extension of Reenactment of Chapter 12, Family Farmer Indebted,
ness, Pub. L. No. 106-5, 113 Stat. 9 (March 30, 1999) (effective April 1, 1999); Bankruptcy-Extension of
Family Farmer Debt Adjustment, Pub. L. No. 106-70, 113 Stat. 1031 (Oct. 9, 1999) (effective Oct. 1,
1999); Bankruptcy-Chapter 12 Reenactment, Pub. L. No. 107-8, 115 Stat. 10 (May 11, 2001) (effective
July 1, 2000); Bankruptcy Chapter 12-Reenactment, Pub. L. No. 107-17, 115 Stat. 151 (June 26, 2001)
(effective June 1, 2001); Bankruptcy-Chapter 12 Reenactment, Pub. L. No. 107-170, 116 Stat. 133 (May 7,
2002) (effective Oct. 1, 2001); Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116
Star. 532 (May 13, 2002) (effective June 1, 2002); Bankruptcy-Chapter 12 Reenactment, Pub. L. No. 107-
377, 116 Stat. 3115 (Dec. 19, 2002) (effective Jan. 1, 2003); Family Farmer Bankruptcy Relief Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-73, 117 Stat. 891 (Aug. 15, 2003) (effective July 1, 2003).
35 See, e.g., Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement on Family Farmer Bankruptcy Protection, H.R. 2465
(July 31, 2003) available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200307/073103d.html ("Everyone agrees that
Chapter 12 has worked.");149 CONG. REC. H5674 (2003) (statement of Rep. Baldwin) ("there is great
consensus that chapter 12 bankruptcy protections work well."); 148 CONG. REc. H6849 (2002) (state-
ment of Rep. Tim Holden) ("Chapter 12 is by no means a controversial issue."); 148 CONG. REc. H6848,
6849-50 (2002) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (commending Rep. Gekas for leadership and unwaver-
ing efforts to make Chapter 12 permanent, and saying farmers and Chapter 12 have been priority from day
one of legislation); 146 CONG. REC. H5101 (2000) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("No one disagrees that
chapter XII (sic.) should be made permanent. No one."). But see United States Department of Agriculture,
Economic Research Service, The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, and Rural America, avail-
able at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Bankruptcies/questions/ (last modified Aug. 9, 2004) ("How-
ever, if one believes that marginal operations should not be given special consideration to keep them in
business, then Chapter 12 has not worked well.").
6See generally Susan A. Schneider, The National Agricultural Law Center, An Agricultural Law Re-
search Note, Chapter 12 Bankruptcy: On Again, Off Again (March 2003, updated February 2004) availa-
ble at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/articles/schneider-chl2.pdf. The last effective
extension (extending Chapter 12 to January 1, 2004) also stated as follows:
(b) All cases commenced or pending under chapter 12 of title 11, United States
Code, as reenacted under subsection (a), and all matters and proceedings in or relat-
ing to such cases, shall be conducted and determined under such chapter as if such
chapter were continued in effect after January 1, 2004. The substantive rights of
parties in connection with such cases, matters, and proceedings shall continue to be
governed under the law applicable to such cases, matters, and proceedings as if such
chapter were continued in effect after January 1, 2004.
Family Farmer Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108,73, 117 Stat. 891.
7See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975, 108th
Cong. § 1001 (2003); Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley: Chapter 12 Bankruptcy For Farm-
ers Extended for Now; President Signs Legislation to Help Farmers Reorganize Debt (May 8, 2002),
available at http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2002/pO2r5-8a.htm (referring to an extension as a "stopgap
measure until we enact the bankruptcy reform bill"); 148 CONG. REc. H6850 (2002) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (blaming lack of Chapter 12 permanence on President Clinton's veto of omnibus bill);
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tive Sensenbrenner even burdened the most recent Chapter 12 extension bill
with the entire omnibus bill.38
To the extent they thought about it at all, some members of Congress
may have believed their inaction to be irrelevant to the system. After all,
Chapter 12 comprises only a small subset of bankruptcies unevenly spread
throughout the country. 39 But what about lawmakers like Senator Grassley,
a friend of family farmers and an early proponent in moving for permanent
authorization?40 Maybe he assumed that farmers would continue to file
Chapter 12 petitions even without a currently authorized Chapter 12,41 or
would find appropriate relief in other chapters.
42
One is reminded of the period following the Supreme Court's decision in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 43 After the
Supreme Court declared the bankruptcy court structure unconstitutional, it
Letter from The Financial Services Roundtable to All Members of the U.S. Senate (Oct. 17, 2000) (prais-
ing conference report for omnibus bill for making Chapter 12 permanent, and urging senators to support)
(on file with author); 149 CONG. REc. H5673 (2003) (statement of Rep. Baldwin) ('[W]e are told that
permanent extension cannot be passed separately from the big bill because taking out a popular item might
slow that bill's momentum. We were told we had to strip the permanent extension of chapter 12 from last
year's farm bill because it would slow down the bankruptcy bill.").
3
8See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, S. 1920, 108th Cong.
(2004) (engrossed amendment as agreed to by the House). See also House Rejects NFU-Approved Chapter
12 Bankruptcy Legislation, 51 NAT'L FARMERS UNION NEws 6 (Feb. 2004).
39See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, Business
and Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, By Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-
Month Period Ending September 30, 2003 (1987,2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpcty
stats/FY1987-2003.pdf; Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Who's Number One?, AM. BANKR. IN T. J., March
1, 2004, at 23 (reporting Nebraska as a leader in annual Chapter 12 filings four times and Texas ten times
between 1989 and 2002).
40Senator Grassley introduced The Family Farmer Protection Act of 1997, S. 1024, 105th Cong.
(1997), as well as the farm bill that initially included chapter 12 permanence. Press Release, Grassley
Works to Extend and Expand Chapter 12 Protection for Farmers (January 20, 1999) (inclusion in
SAFETY 2000 bill). See generally Jonathan K. Van Patten, Chapter 12 in the Courts, 38 S.D. L. REV. 52,
53 (1993) (discussing Senator Grassley's central role in initial enactment of Chapter 12).
4 As it turns out, family farmers filed only a handful of Chapter 12 petitions during periods of expira-
tion. For example, fewer than twenty Chapter 12 petitions were filed in January through March 31, 2002,
and in January through March 31, 2004, when Chapter 12 had expired and not been reauthorized. See
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Business and Non-Business Bankruptcy Cases Com-
menced, By Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/302
f2 3.xls; http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/f23mos.xls.
42See 148 CONG. REC. H6848, 6849 (2002) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting that in absence
of Chapter 12, family farmers can use other chapters, although these do not work as well); Bruce L. Dixon
et al., Factors Affecting State-Level Chapter 12 Filing Rates: A Panel Data Model, 20 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 401, 405 (2004) (speculating that many consumers use Chapter 13 who fit some expansive defini-
tions of family farmer); Bruce L. Dixon et al., The Chapter 12 Experience in the U.S.: Regional Comparisons
and Analysis of Filing, Discharge, and Failure Rates, 55 AGRiC. FIN. REV. 47 (1995) (discussing use of
Chapter 7 for farm bankruptcies).
4 3Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 459 U.S. 1094 (1982).
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stayed its order to give Congress time to act.44 Yet, it was unclear how the
bankruptcy judges had the authority to continue to hear and decide the hun-
dreds of thousands of pending cases in the meantime. 45 Congress did not act
in a particularly timely fashion,46 allowing plenty of time for the legislation to
become mired in various special interest issues.47 The Judicial Conference of
the United States tried to ameliorate the situation with its proposed Emer-
gency Rule, 48 although that Rule itself seemed unconstitutional.49  Yet, for
"Id. The opinion was released in June of 1982, but the order was stayed until October 1982, and
later extended until December.
45See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. Rrv. 479, 493 (1997) (using
Emergency Rule as example of "a system imperative overriding the unambiguous command of the formal
law").
46Congress did not fix the problem until the Bankruptcy Amendment and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 353 (1984), which became effective in July of that year.
47The media framed the debates over this early 1980s bankruptcy legislation as being entangled in
special interest lobbying. See Bankrupt on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 1984, at 26 (transforma-
tion of clean bill into Christmas tree, -disgraceful" bills laden with special interests); Bankruptcy Bill is
Stalled, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 1984, at D 13 ("lobbying free-for-all ... deadlock ... not the result of some
lofty dispute of great moment. It is a result of spending both political clout and political dollars by the
consumer finance industry, which wants to be protected from the consumer bankruptcies that its easy
credit practices often create."); Bankruptcy Courts are Going Bust, N.Y. TIMES, September 28, 1982, at 22
(measure to fix court system "could be threatened by amendments that would make it a Christmas tree for
creditors."); Bill Keller, Senate Votes Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1984, at D 19 (discussing provi-
sions desired by lobbying interests); System in Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., April 5, 1984 ("Next, various
special interests climbed aboard the legislative train .... You can't shed many tears for the special-interest
aid in this collapsed legislation."); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Bankruptcy Court Setup Extended Until April 30,
N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1984, § 1, at 32 (stopgap measure for courts while working out special interest
issues); Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Free-For-All on the Bankruptcy Express, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 1984, at 16
(lobbying free-for-all, three ring circus, with sideshows involving shopping centers, drunk drivers, grain
elevators); Jane Bryant Quinn, Credit Industry Media Hype Pushes Bankruptcy Law Revision, WASH.
POST, December 7, 1981, at 51 ("Consumer-credit industry wants to rewrite the federal law on personal
bankruptcies, and is using tactics that would make a sailor blush .... Newswriters and broadcasters are
being peppered with press releases, asserting that America has become a nation of debt dodgers."). See also
William H. Jones, Creditors Miss Target in War on Bankruptcy Law, WASH. POST, October 12, 1981, at 1;
Panel Bill Alters Personal Bankruptcy Law; Proposals Aid Creditors: Bid to Bar Some Debtors From Chap-
ter 7 is Ended, WALL ST. J., April 20, 1983, at 60; Lawrence P. King, The Plague of the Special Interest
Groups, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 1984, at § 3, at 2 (opinion piece saying "indeed we may all be the fools,
victims of extraordinary lobbying efforts by special interest groups that have held up legislation that
would establish a new court because of their selfish demands for unrelated bankruptcy amendments");
Richard B. Levin, Where Some Fine Tuning Could Help, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 1984, § 3, at 2 (opinion
piece explaining consumer finance industry's "horror stories of doctors and others with promising futures
who escape debt" have not been shown to be frequent). See also Eric Gelman, Christopher Ma and Ann L.
McDaniel, Bankruptcy on the Brink, NEWSWEEK, March 26, 1984, at 64 ("As Congress moved to correct
that [jurisdictional] defect, eager lobbyists" representing lenders, farmers, and even federal judges "cut in
to prosecute their own claims, blocking action and turning the orderly dance of legislation into a game of
musical chairs," with the loudest objections coming from the consumer credit industry.).
4
See, e.g., S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials and Core Proceedings: The Bankruptcy Court's Uncertain
Authority, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 158 (1991).
"See Vern Countryman, Emergency Rule Compounds Emergency, 57 AM. BA-KR. . . 1 (1983); Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 479, 494 (1997).
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the most part, the system soldiered on, even in the absence of constitutionally
valid statutory authority for bankruptcy judges to adjudicate.
Realistically, few members of Congress would have had post-Marathon
events in mind with respect to Chapter 12 reauthorization. Perhaps they
assumed that family farmers would not notice the absence of Chapter 12
from the statute. As it turns out, however, others in and familiar with the
small farm industry find the failure to act notable and consequential.50 In
addition to substantially deterring the filing of Chapter 12 cases, 51 the com-
plete absence of Chapter 12 for months at a time may have affected negotia-
tions between lenders and family farmers.52  After all, although the
bankruptcy system develops somewhat independently of the statute, the sys-
tem can be only so resilient with respect to the disappearance of an entire
chapter of the Code.
53
Unlike the jurisdictional crisis of the early 1980s, the Chapter 12 fix was
straightforward and not particularly controversial or time consuming. Con-
gress declined to act. Likewise, Congress has kept the authorization of addi-
tional bankruptcy judgeships attached to the omnibus bankruptcy bill
notwithstanding the substantial growth in per-judgeship caseload. 54 These
examples do not bode well for less favored portions of the Code and for
relying on Code amendments to accomplish reform.
"°United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, The Economics of Food,
Farning, Natural Resources, and Rural America (September 23, 2003) available at http://www.ers.usda.
gov/Briefing/Bankruptcies/questions/; House Rejects NFU-Approved Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Legislation,
51 NAT'L FARMERS UNION NEws 6 (Feb. 2004) ("NFU President Dave Frederickson said the delay in
approving an extension of Chapter 12 places agricultural producers and their families who are faced with
bankruptcy in a serious position."); Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement on Family Farmer Bankruptcy Pro-
tection, H.R. 2465 (July 31, 2003) available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200307/073103d.html ("Too
many family farmers have been left in legal limbo in bankruptcy courts across the country because Chapter
12 of the Bankruptcy Code is still a temporary measure. Our family farmers do not deserve these lapses in
bankruptcy law that could mean the difference between foreclosure and farming."). For a study of the
impact of financial failure in family farming generally, see KATHRYN M. DUDLEY, DEBT AND DISPOSSES-
SION: FARM Loss iN AMERICA'S HEARTLAND (2000).
5See infra note 41; 146 CONG. REC. H5101 (2000) (explaining why Chapter 11 does not work as well
for farmers as Chapter 12).
5
2See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION 1015 (1997) (describing
farmer negotiations in shadow of Chapter 12). Compare Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargain-
ing in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979).
"'On the other hand, a very recent analysis of determinants of Chapter 12 filings does not mention
instability of Chapter 12 as a potential determinant. See Bruce L. Dixon et al., Factors Affecting State-
Level Chapter 12 Filing Rates: A Panel Data Model, 20 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 401, 405 (2004).
54See, e.g., J. Rich Leonard, Having Thought About Private Matters: The Federal Courts' Initial Re-
sponse, 77 Am. BANKR. L.J. 9, 18 n.31 (2003) (noting how judgeship authorizations have become ensnared
in omnibus bill, and comparing to Chapter 12 impasse); Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Abandonments in Bank-
ruptcy: Unifying Competing Tax and Bankruptcy Policies, 88 MINN. L. REV. 723, 724 n.9 (2004) (citing
Jim Wannamaker, Record Bankruptcy Filings, NABTALK, Fall 2002, at 35).
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II. LIMITED BANKRUPTCY CODE CONTROL OF THE
CURRENT SYSTEM
Congressional indifference is disappointing, but how much does it matter?
To be sure, the Code is the legal backbone for a bankruptcy system that
involves hundreds of billions of dollars of assets and is otherwise relevant to
the national economy. 5" The Bankruptcy Code also subtly but fundamen-
tally structures the way we think about the law of financial problems of
individuals and firms. Consider bankruptcy's role in corporate governance,56
small business policy,57 health care finance,5s consumer protection,59 con-
sumer credit policy, 60 and debtor-creditor relations. Bankruptcy is closely
linked with these issues, but, on account of the Bankruptcy Code, is legally
distinct. For example, it is by human action and not inherent logic that con-
sumer bankruptcy is legally separate from other programs for financially dis-
tressed families, which, in some instances, may be substitutes for bankruptcy
(and vice versa).61 On the federal level alone, we have a bankruptcy system,
a host of cash or in-kind assistance programs, 62 and an entirely distinct mili-
tary program with some bankruptcy-like features.63 The choice to produce a
5SSee Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bank-
ruptcy, 73 Am. BANKR. LJ. 499, 507 (1999), citing LEGAL DEPARTMENT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, ORDERLY & EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES: KEY ISSUES (Washington 1999); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004) (citing THE BANKRUPTCY
YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 2003, 38 (Christopher M. McHugh et al., eds., 13th ed. 2003)).
6 See Karen Gross, A Response to JJ. White's Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit: Finding Some
Trees But Missing the Forest, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 203, 216-17 (2004); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519 (2004).
57See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bank-
ruptcy, 73 Am. BANKR. L.J. 499 (1999); Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level
of Entrepreneurial Activity, 46 J.L. & ECON. 543 (2003).
5SSee Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates Over Health
Care Financing: Evidence From the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001); Melissa B. Jacoby,
The Debtor-Patient; In Search of Non-Debt Alternatives, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 453 (2004).
"See William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer
Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397 (1994).
6'See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Living on Borrowed Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at 21.
6iSee, e.g., JONATHAN D. FISHER, THE EFFECT OF TRANSFER PROGRAMS ON PERSONAL BANK-
RUPTCY (U.S. Department of Labor, Working Paper No. 3.46, Oct. 2001) (finding 37.7% of bankruptcy
filers in Panel Study of Income Dynamics sample received income from one of several income transfer
programs), available at http://www.bls.gov/ore/pdf/ec010140.pdf.
62
See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify The Means?, 75 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 243 (2001) (arguing that bankruptcy should be viewed as part of the public assistance
system).
The federal law and policy governing financial assistance to needy individuals actually spans dozens of
programs. See, e.g., General Accounting Office, Means Tested Programs: Determining Financial Eligibility
is Cumbersome and Can Be Simplified, GAO-02-58 (November 2001) (noting existence of about 80 differ-
ent means tested federal programs and observing different standards, definitions, and forms used by various
programs), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0258.pdf.
6 The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, now the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, suspends
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cohesive Bankruptcy Code separate from other laws has so powerfully
shaped the architecture of financial distress that we often forget there ever
were choices to be made.
Nonetheless, much of the bankruptcy system itself develops irrespective
of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, one could never predict, solely from
the Code, that Chapter 13 cases would comprise fewer than four percent of
consumer filings in the Northern District of Iowa but hit seventy-two per-
cent in the Southern District of Georgia. 64 These very important, and some-
times puzzling, attributes of the consumer bankruptcy system have developed
almost entirely through non-statutory means.
65
In addition, Chapters 7 and 13 are far more similar than the Code and its
legislative history would lead a reader to assume.66 Both Chapter 7 debtors
and Chapter 13 debtors tend to keep their property; most consumer debtors
certain debt obligations for a member of the military when pressed into service. See Conroy v. Aniskoff,
507 U.S. 511 (1993). Codified at 50 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., a long-awaited update was signed into law in
December 2003. See generally Gregory M. Huckabee, Congress Does it Again- The Ghost of Major John
Wigmore Returns!, 51 FED. LAWYER 21 (May 2004) (outlining eleven major changes); John T. Meixell,
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Replaces Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, Department of the Army
Pamphlet 27-50-367, ARMY LAWYER 38 (Dec. 2003); John F. Zink, Legal Protection for the Citizen Soldier,
19 ME. BAR J. 98 (2004). This Act has not prevented military families from seeking regular bankruptcy
relief, however. See Letter from Derek B. Stewart, General Accounting Office to the Honorable Richard J.
Durbin, Military Personnel; Bankruptcy Filings Among Active Duty Service Members, GAO-04-465R
(February 27, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04465r.pdf. Perhaps the recent up-
dates to the Servicemembers Act will make it a better replacement for bankruptcy.
64Many researchers have documented and discussed the non-uniformity of Chapter 13 filing ratios.
See, e.g., Michael Bork & Susan D. Tuck, Bankruptcy Statistical Trends: Chapter 13, Adjustment of Debts
of an Individual with Regular Income (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts Working Paper No. 1, Jan. 1994);
Rafi Efrat, Legal Culture and Bankruptcy: A Comparative Perspective, 20 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 351
(2004); Ed Flynn et al., Bankruptcy by the Numbers: A Tale of Two Chapters, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct.
21, 2002, at 20 (2002); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of
Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 801 (1994). This is one of
many persistent complaints about non-uniformity in the bankruptcy system. See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp,
Bound by the BAP: The Stare Decisis Effect of BAP Decisions, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1643, 1680-82
(1997); John K. Eason, Developing the Asset Protection Dynamic: A Legacy of Federal Concern, 31 HoF.
STRA L. REv. 24, 62 (2002); Barbara J. Van Gorder, Section 523(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Code: A Paving
Stone on the Road to the Region of Hades Reservedfor Litigation Nightmares, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1121, 1125
(1997); Richard E. Mendales, Rethinking Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 40 B.C. L. REv. 851, 860,875 (1999);
Rose J. Murphy, Bankruptcy Exemptions: The Need for Uniformity in the United States and Canada, 21
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 127, 128, 138-42 (2001).
65
See generally Rafi Efrat, Legal Culture and Bankruptcy: A Comparative Perspective, 20 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 351 (2004).
'The chapters are not identical, of course. A cynic might observe that a principal difference between
Chapters 7 and 13 is whether the debtor directly makes ongoing mortgage payments or is required to
funnel them through the bankruptcy system. In addition, debtors are substantially less likely to receive a
discharge in Chapter 13. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured; The Rhetorical
Significance, But Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 263
(2001).
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do not forfeit non-exempt property even in Chapter 7.67 They also are re-
taining homes and cars encumbered by security interests through ride-
through (if permitted in the jurisdiction), 68 reaffirmation,69 or redemption.70
From the perspective of creditor returns, Chapters 7 and 13 also are produc-
ing similar winners and losers notwithstanding distinctions in the Code, with
general unsecured creditors being the losers in both. Holders of general un-
secured claims are known to get little through distribution of property in
Chapter 7.7 1 The publicly available data suggest that most of the money in
Chapter 13 goes to everyone other than unsecured claims (namely, secured
claims, priority claims, lawyers, trustees, and the cost of administering repay-
ment plans).72 According to United States Trustee Chapter 13 disburse-
ment data on closed cases, many Chapter 13 cases in which unsecured debt is
owed pay out only small portions on unsecured claims, and many others pay
out nothing at all.73 The Code plays some role in these patterns,74 but the
6 7See, e.g., Ed Flynn et al., supra note 64 (most distributions in Chapter 7 coming from few large cases
which mostly involved commercial debtors).
6 Compare, e.g., In re Price, 370 F.3d 362 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that debtor may retain collateral and
continue contract payments, and noting existing 4-4 circuit split on issue) and In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843
(1st Cir. 1998) (no authorization for ridethrough).
69See 11 U.S.C. § 524; Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empiri-
cal Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 713 (1999).7°See 11 U.S.C. § 722.
7'Unsecured debt can get paid after Chapter 7 through voluntary repayment or through new agree-
ments to remain liable on the debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 524; Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White,
Debt After Discharge, An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. LJ. 709, 713 (1999) (finding
about twenty-five percent of case files with one or more reaffirmation agreements, and reporting that
about sixty percent of these agreements were related to unsecured or nominally secured debts); Consumer
Bankruptcy Project III (on file with author) (finding about twenty percent of case files included one or
more reaffirmation agreement); Transcript, Presentation of National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition to
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 166 (December 17, 1996) (representative of Sears testifying
that reaffirmed debt portfolio performed 37.6% better than its overall portfolio) (on file with author).72 See Executive Office for United States Trustees, Chapter 13 Trustee Audited Annual Reports
FY2003 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/library/chapter13/ch13lib.htm. Looking at the
universe of cases closed in FY2003, as the U.S. Trustee report does, general unsecured claims received only
about twenty percent of total distributions. See also Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New
Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv.
415, 460 (1999) (in Mississippi study, finding secured debt payments accounted for about ninety percent
of all Chapter 13 payments, excluding attorneys' fees). See generally Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Per-
sonal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial Activity, 46 J.L. & ECON. 543, 545 (2003) (positing that
there is little difference between chapters from creditors' viewpoint).
73See Executive Office for United States Trustees, Chapter 13 Trustee Audited Annual Reports
FY2003 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/library/chapter13/ch13lib.htm. This report iden-
tifies ranges of percentages of unsecured claims paid in cases closed in FY2003. Among these cases with
unsecured debt and with payment information identified, almost forty percent paid nothing on their un-
secured claims. More than a third paid thirty-nine percent or less. Even among the subset of cases closed
due to plan completion (as opposed to dismissal or conversion), about 6.3% paid nothing on their un,
secured claims and a bit over fifty percent paid thirtynine percent or less. Using different data and after
accounting for costs, one industry expert estimates that credit card lenders receive on average thirteen
cents on the dollar from Chapter 13 repayment plans, and even less if they sell the debt to purchasers and
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patterns do not appear to conform to any intentional design.
The Bankruptcy Code also does not explain or control changes over time
in Chapter 11. Once upon a time, commentators noted that Chapter 11 took
too long and cost too much, for little reward.75 Debtors' managers seemed to
exercise undue control over the Chapter 11 process.76 In part due to these
concerns, corporate and bankruptcy scholars believed the current system to
be less efficient than alternative regimes they proposed.
77
Today, heightened incorporation of commercial and corporate practices,
and shrewd negotiation, give non-debtor parties considerable leverage and
make asset sales an even greater component of the bankruptcy process. 78 The
brokers, Bankruptcy Debt Recovery - Part 2, THE NILSON REPORT No. 782, at 6 (Feb. 2003), although
informal discussions with industry lawyers suggest that this estimate is too high.
74For example, the Code authorization to deaccelerate and cure a mortgage in default surely helps
account for the significant amount of secured debt funneled through Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322,
1325.
75See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J.
FIN. 1067, 1077 (1984); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 729 (1993);
Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 285, 285-89 (1990) (estimating direct costs for publicly held firms at three percent of assets). See
also Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy,
73 AM. BANKR. L.J., 499, 500 (1999) (given size of most businesses when they file, Chapter 11 may be too
expensive for them). For a summary and recent analysis of these arguments and sources, see Stephen J.
Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in
Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L. J. 509 (2000).
76See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 272-73 (1983); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue
Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991
Wis. L. REV. 11 (1991).
77See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45
STA s. L. REV. 311 (1993); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101
HARV. L. REv. 775 (1988); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,
101 YAL L.J. 1043 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bank-
ruptcy, 71 TEx. L. REv. 51 (1992); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business
Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998). See generally Mark Jickling, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: The Economic
Issues, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 96-426E (April 30, 1996) (on file with au-
thor); Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (2001);
David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wisc. L. REV.
465 (1993); Omer Teme, Revisiting the Creditors' Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus
in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 287, 288-95 (2003) (reviewing literature).
71See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
751 (2002); Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 69, 75 (2004)
('The ability of creditors to control their debtor and negotiate with each other outside of chapter 11 is
now vastly greater than it was during the equity receivership - or even in chapter 11 just 20 years ago.
Often chapter 11 is needed only to put in place a plan that the key players negotiated before the petition
was filed."); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1987, 2014-15 (2002) (discussing role of distressed debt trading, and value of speed to speculators, in
changing dynamics of Chapter 11 cases); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: The 'New' New Corporate
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003); Symposium, Mega-Bankruptcies: Representing
Creditors and Debtors in Large Bankruptcies, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 603 (2003) (discussing esti-
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literature also reflects a far diminished concern about weak cases languishing
in Chapter 11 over long periods of time.79 Indeed, to the extent that repeat
filings are any indication,8° cases may be moving too fast.8 ' Even if reports of
sweeping change in Chapter 11 are overstated,82 it is clear that Chapter 11 is
capable of transformation without Bankruptcy Code amendment.8 3  The
mates that as many as half of Chapter 11 cases are really just asset sales); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Law-
rence Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 (2003); James J. White, Death
and Resurrection of Secured Credit, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 139, 164 (2004) ("Well-heeled and well
represented, secured creditors have made the most of these [secured creditor protective] provisions in the
25 years since the Code's adoption"). But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Finn: A
Response to Baird and Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645 (2003) (challenging
empirical case for assertion of widespread change to Chapter 11 practice).
79See generally Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 356 (2001) (finding, based on study of cases in Northern District of Illinois, that courts do good
job of dealing with dead-on-arrival cases quickly); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at
Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 263 (2004); Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 69, 76 (2004) (using LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database to find high proportion of
prenegotiated plans that are confirmed within several months after filing); Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M.
LoPucki, Shoppingfor Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 982-83 (1999) (noting several trends coinciding including reduction in case
processing time and increases in prepackaged bankruptcies); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas,
Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357, 1374-76
(2000); Elizabeth Tashjian et al., Prepacks: An Empirical Analysis of Prepackaged Bankruptcies, 40 J. FIN.
ECON. 135, 142 (1996); James J. White, Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 139, 151, n.42 (2004) (showing decline in mean Chapter 11 duration using LoPucki Bankruptcy
Database).
s"See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 35 n.128 (2003) (anecdotal and systematic evidence of repeat Chapter 1 is); Lynn M.
LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Companies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence
of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001) (finding higher repeat filing rates in Delaware and
New York); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy
Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1964 (2002) (possible attribution of refiling frequency
to higher proportion of prepackaged cases); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the
Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987, 2014-15 (2002) (attributing Chapter 11 recidivism in Delaware
in part to distressed debt buyers who value speed over continuity of the enterprise).
SiSome cases may be moving too fast even if no repeat filing follows. For example, Cannondale was on
a fast track to a sale to a stalking horse bidder that left other creditors and potential investors with very
little opportunity to evaluate the case. See Motion for Two-Week Continuance of Bidding Procedures
Motion, In re Cannondale Corp., No. 03-50017 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003); Objection by Unsecured Credi-
tors' Committee, In re Cannondale Corp., No. 03-50017 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003); Order Approving Sale of
Substantially All Assets, In re Cannondale Corp., No. 03-50017 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003). See also Over-
sight Hearing on the Administration of Large Business Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Subcomm. on Com-
mercial and Administrative Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, 108th
Cong. (July 21, 2004) (statement of Professor Lynn M. LoPucki) (discussing quickly moving pre-negoti,
ated sale cases).
2 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219 (2004); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy,
56 STAN. L. REV. 645 (2003); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Bankruptcy Control of the Recovery Process, 12
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 245 n.4 (2004).
S3See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 498 (1997);
James J. White, Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 139 (2004).
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Bankruptcy Code is important, but not all-important.
III. RETHINKING THE MEANING OF BANKRUPTCY REFORM
In the prior section, I observed that changing the Code has not been the
exclusive means of shaping and changing the bankruptcy system. Current
Congressional attitudes place a heightened burden on these non-Code means
of system evolution. In this section, I discuss discrete ways in which bank-
ruptcy professionals remain involved in setting the direction of the bank-
ruptcy system even as Code-based reform stagnates and excludes bankruptcy
experts.
A. PROFESSIONAL-TO-PROFESSIONAL
As suggested in the Chapter 11 discussion in the prior section, negotia-
tion among bankruptcy professionals on a case-by-case basis has been, and
will continue to be, a major force. Bankruptcy professionals and their clients
engage in a considerable amount of bankruptcy decision-making every day,
including deals that technically violate the Bankruptcy Code.8 4 Although the
United States Trustee or Bankruptcy Administrator may have the capacity
to limit this private lawmaking,8 5 their intervention is not consistent. One
can expect the system to continue to develop well-engrained patterns and
practices through these means. This is not revolutionary reform; it is evolu-
tionary reform.
Bankruptcy experts also can collaborate on broader system projects. For
example, a recent dialogue by Chapter 13 professionals on non-uniformity
resulted in a model Chapter 13 plan.8 6 Although the Advisory Committee
on Bankruptcy Rules declined to pursue the professionals' request to make
their model plan an official form,s7 the model plan has the potential to change
S4Pre-packs confirmed within thirty days, notwithstanding the requirement of a meeting of creditors
under 11 U.S.C. § 341, would fall within this category.
"5For example, holders of claims in Chapter 11 cases may be routinely signing voting agreements,
notwithstanding the fact that some interpret these agreements as violating § 1125. See In re Stations
Holding Co., 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1617, 02-10882 (Bankr. D. Del. September 30, 2002) (explaining that
votes were designated and disqualified for those who had executed postpetition voting agreements); Tran-
script of Hearing at 59-65, In re NIl Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 02-11505 (Bankr. D. Del. October 25, 2002)
(designating and disqualifying votes by noteholders who formally executed voting agreements postpeti-
tion); Douglas E. Deutsch, Ensuring Proper Bankruptcy Solicitation: Evaluating Bankruptcy Law, the First
Amendment, The Code of Ethics, and Securities Law in Bankruptcy Solicitation Cases, 11 Am. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 213, 259-61 (2003). But see Melissa B. Jacoby, Prepacks and the Deal.Litigation Tension,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., March 2004, at 20; Robert J. Keach, A Hole in the Glove: Why "Negotiation" Should
Trump 'Solicitation," AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2003, at 22.
"5See, e.g., Henry E. Hildebrand, III and Keith M. Lundin, The San Juan 50: A Proposed Model Form
for the Chapter 13 Plan, 7 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1 (July 2002); Henry E. Hildebrand, III, Toward
a More Perfect Plan, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, at 10.
"7See Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, Minutes, Meeting of April 3-4, 2003, Longboat Key
Florida, at 11, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/BKmin0403.pdf. The Committee's
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the system without any Bankruptcy Code amendments if its proponents can
encourage its use through local rules or informal adoption.ss In the past, by
contrast, complaints of non-uniformity often generated proposed statutory
amendments.8 9 In addition to being infeasible, Code amendments actually
may be inferior vehicles to this type of grassroots model plan effort.90
Of course, in some instances, a single statutory amendment might have
been more efficient than alternative means. For example, with respect to the
privacy concerns arising from the use of electronic files, an amendment to 11
U.S.C. § 107 may have been a more straightforward solution than a patch-
work of changes to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Offi-
cial Forms.91 Nonetheless, professional-driven reform that is implemented
through rules and forms can be potent and successful.
B. COURTS OF APPEAL
Appellate judges are likely to be more receptive than members of Con-
gress or Congressional staffers to careful and well-grounded arguments by
bankruptcy experts. Even under a so-called plain meaning analysis, some
judges believe that context is critical to accurate statutory interpretation and
construction.92 Bankruptcy experts have strong abilities to contribute to this
approach to system change.
93
meeting minutes reflect that various committee members thought the project time consuming (to get
agreement on a form), unrealistic (because everyone would like her own form better than the forms of
others), and unnecessary (because Chapter 13 was working fine as is).
Ssee, e.g., Kenneth N. Klee, The Future of the Bankruptcy Rules, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 277, 280-81
(1996) (discussing various forms of local rules and practices).
S
9 For example, a majority of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposed amendments to
increase the uniformity of the Chapter 13 repayment process. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
REVIEW COMMISSION 262 (1997). Specifically, the Commission proposed a statutory income-based tem-
plate and timetable for debt repayment.
'Admittedly, even if the model Chapter 13 form is widely implemented, it will leave many non-
uniformity problems unaddressed, including the very ones the Bankruptcy Commission tried to tackle.
9iSee generally J. Rich Leonard, Having Thought About Private Matters: The Federal Courts' Initial
Response, 77 Am. BANKR. L.J. 9 (2003).
9 See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362 (3d Cir. 2004) (reviewing and evaluating interpretation-related case
law).
93For studies of the impact of more generalist statutory interpretation scholarship, see, e.g., Gregory
Scott Crespi, The Influence of a Decade of Statutory Interpretation Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An
Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU L. REV. 9, 11 (2000) (observing that "almost half of the statutory interpreta-
tion articles published between 1988 and 1995 have been cited in at least one judicial opinion," and that
at least seven statutory interpretation articles published during the past decade have been rather exten-
sively cited by the courts") and Deborah Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and
Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV. 871 (1996) (discussing role
of academic writers in statutory interpretation). See also Karen Gross, A Response to JJ. White's Death
and Resurrection of Secured Credit: Finding Some Trees But Missing the Forest, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 203, 213 (2004) ('perhaps academics have their greatest success when they proffer an approach to
interpreting a particular statutory provision within the Code and argue for resolution among some well-
known competing approaches").
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The now-well-known Cybergenics II case offers a good example. A panel
of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided that a creditors' com-
mittee is not authorized to bring an avoidance action on behalf of the estate. 94
The panel's reasoning was based in part on a U.S. Supreme Court decision
interpreting an identical phrase in a different statutory section.95
In public writings, many members of the bankruptcy community reacted
to the original panel decision with panic, anger, scorn, and general outcry. 96
This is not the place to recount the details, but the commentators essentially
argued, among other things, that a literal statutory interpretation and con-
struction actually supported the committee's authorization to pursue the ac-
tion.97 Commentators also suggested that the Court of Appeals needs a
94Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 304 F.3d 316 (3d Cir.
2002), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 310 F.3d 785 (3d Cir. 2002), rev'd, Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2003).
9 5Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 120 S. Ct. 1942 (2000). But see
David Gray Carlson, Surcharge and Standing: Bankruptcy Code § 506(c) after Hartford Underwriters, 76
AM. BANKR. L.J. 43, 56-61 (2002) (arguing that careful reading of Hartford Underwriters reveals that
opinion does not always limit standing of parties other than trustees).
9 6See, e.g., Michael A. Bloom & Joel S. Solomon, Cybergenics II: Ignoring both Precedent and Pragma-
tism, 11 J. BANKR. L. & Pitc. 417 (2002); Creditor/Committee Derivative Litigation Of Textualism and
Equitable Powers, 22 BANKR. L. LETTER 1. (Nov. 2002) ("Cybergenics II represents a new low in the
modern mindless obsession with mechanical application of statutory text (to the exclusion of every other
legitimate principle of American law) .. . a full understanding of the structural relationship the Bankruptcy
Code establishes between 'the powers of the trustee' and 'the avenues for relief available under the Code
for the benefit of creditors and the estate' (which the Cybergenics II court obviously did not possess)
exposes the Cybergenics II court's textual analysis, and in particular, its reliance on Hartford Underwriters,
to be exceedingly simplistic and woefully incomplete."); Cybergenics Decision Leaves Many Stunned,
Scrambling to Find Solution, BANKR. CT. DECISIONs, November 19, 2002, at 1 (quoting lawyers opposing
decision, including Martin Bienenstock saying "I think it's the wrong decision technically, the wrong
decision policy-wise, the wrong decision based on the wording of the Code, and the wrong decision based
on the jurisprudence." . . ."Bienenstock said the court's decision not only lacked sense, it didn't give
direction to anyone about how they may proceed."); Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Grants En Banc
Review in Cybergenics Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 21, 2002 (noting that bankruptcy lawyers "eve-
rywhere are breathing a sigh of relief" after en banc decision); Past Decisions Make Cybergenics Look
Strange, Lawyer Says, BANKR. CT. DEcIsIoNs, Nov. 19, 2002, at 4. See also Marianne B. Culhane, Poking
Holes in Golden Parachutes: Management Pensions at Risk in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan.
2004, at 6 (referring readers to "lively comments" on Cybergenics on the American Bankruptcy Institute
website); Robert J. Keach & Michael A. Fagone, When the Committee is Not and When the Committee is
No More, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34 (Dec./Jan. 2004) (noting "momentary panic" after panel decision,
"order appears restored" by en banc decision). See generally Nancy Hailer, Comment, Cybergenics II: Prece-
dent and Policy versus Plain Meaning, 56 ME. L. REV. 365 (2004).
97See, e.g., Martin J. Bienenstock, Recent Developments Affecting Chapter 11 Cases, 850 PLI/CoMM 7
(Apr. 2003) (arguing that Cybergenics panel decision should be overruled and generally not followed else-
where because, among other reasons, decision violates several rules of statutory construction); Susheel
Kirpalani, The Importance of Being Plain: A Textual Response to Cybergenics 11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1
(Nov. 2002); Alan R. Lepene & Sean A. Gordon, The Case for Derivative Standing in Chapter 11: "It's
The Plain Meaning, Stupid," 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 313, 316 (2004) ("This article will demon-
strate that by properly following Hartford Underwriters' road map to plain meaning construction of the
Bankruptcy Code, the case for derivative standing in the context of chapter 11 cases is both compelling
and clear.").
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richer appreciation of bankruptcy practice when it interprets or construes the
statute and decides these types of disputes.98 With some similar arguments,
bankruptcy lawyers and professors filed amicus briefs,99 either on their own
behalf,100 or on the behalf of creditors' committees in other cases. 1 1
The end of this story is known to most who will read this Article: The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the panel decision, reheard
the case en banc, and reversed the panel decision.102 The published majority
opinion-the citations, the serious engagement with the arguments of the
amici-is a testament to the impact and persuasive authority of bankruptcy
experts beyond those representing the parties in interest.'0 3 With respect to
the question of pre-Code practice, the en banc Cybergenics majority placed
"great weight" on the 1978 version of Collier on Bankruptcy and consumes
two full columns of the opinion with string citations to this source closely
associated with bankruptcy experts.'0 4 In other words, the bankruptcy ex-
9SSee, e.g., George W. Kuney, Let's Make it Official: Adding an Explicit Pre-Plan Sale Process as an
Alternative Exit from Bankruptcy, 40 Hous. L. REv. 1265, 1292 n.98 (describing Cybergenics as being
decided based on bankruptcy practice rather than explicit statutory authorization). Cf. Leonard P. Gold-
berger, Cybergenics II: Sounds Great, But Will It Work?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan. 2003, at 30
(noting, after original panel decision, that "Appellate courts have the luxury of making ground-breaking
legal pronouncements without worrying (too much) about how they are actually implemented. This is
especially so in bankruptcy practice, where legal principles must be road-tested in a highly practical, result,
oriented court system"). See generally Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 69 (2004) ("The courts of appeal and the Supreme Court generate a regular flow of authori-
tative interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code, often focusing on its language, separate from its history or
the practices that have taken deep root in large and small cases over the last 25 years.").
99Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 555 (3d Cir.
2003) ('We have since accepted extensive supplemental briefing, including a number of amicus briefs, and
heard oral argument by the parties and amicus curiae").
"O°See, e.g., En Banc Brief of Amicus Curiae G. Eric Brunstad Jr. in Support of Appellant, Cybergenics
Corp. the Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 2002 WL 32137102
(3d Cir. December 16, 2002) (No. 01-3805); Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors In Support of The
Appeal of The Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp., 2002 WL 32137095 (3d
Cir. Dec. 13, 2002) (No. 01-3805). By contrast, Professor Keith Sharfman wrote a brief supporting the
appellees, but using very different arguments. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Keith Sharfman in Support of
the Appellees, Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp., 2003 WL 21745357 (3d Cir.
Feb. 6, 2003) (No. 01-3805).
i"'Brief of Amicus Curiae, Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Hayes Lemmerz International,
Inc. and Affiliated Chapter 11 Debtors, in Support of Appellant and Seeking Reversal of the District
Court, Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 2002 WL 32137101 (3d
Cir. Dec. 16, 2002) (No. 01-3805); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
Safety-Kleen Corp., et al. in Support of Appellant and Reversal, Cybergenics Corp., Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 2002 WL 32137094 (3d Cir. Dec. 13, 2002) (No.
01-3805).
"2Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir.
2003) (en banc).
1
0 3ld. at 562-63, 565, 572-73 (quoting and discussing perspectives, usually favorably, of amici Brunstad
or law professors supporting appellant). By contrast, the dissenting opinion does not cite the briefwriters
or rely as heavily on bankruptcy-specific sources. Id. at 580-87 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
i14Id. at 571 (citing multiple sections and paragraphs of COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th Ed. 1978),
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perts of today and of twenty-five years ago were integral to determining that
the creditors' committee had the right to bring avoidance actions notwith-
standing certain Code language. Even if some disagree with the rationale of
the en banc majority opinion,105 this opinion is a testament to the role of
bankruptcy experts in shaping the system.
C. STATE LEGISLATURES
Bankruptcy relies heavily on non-bankruptcy state law.106 Thus, even if
one is excluded from working with Congress, she may affect bankruptcy out-
comes, and transactions for which bankruptcy law is a backdrop, by seeking
state law changes or clarifications, particularly through statutory means.
For example, Revised Article 9 affects bankruptcy outcomes regarding
the treatment, priority, and protection of secured creditors.10 7 In addition,
while parties have so far failed in their competing attempts to define asset
securitization in the federal law,108 some state legislatures have defined asset
securitization in ways intended to apply in bankruptcy1 09 Furthermore,
noting that "Collier's view is persuasive on such matters, for the Supreme Court has itself cited to it as
evidence" that a particular practice was "widely accepted" under the Bankruptcy Act and emphasizing the
importance of "Collier's sense of the law").
°'For example, one amicus argued in favor of appellees. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Keith Sharfman in
Support of the Appellees, Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 2003
WL 21745357 (3d Cir. Feb. 6, 2003) (No. 01-3805). The court of appeals engaged in the arguments made
in Professor Sharfman's brief, but, in the end, mostly disagreed. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Credi-
tors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 564, 565,571, 574, 575, 576 (3d Cir. 2003).
106See generally In re Earley, 305 B.R. 837 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 2004) (using Illinois state law to determine
proper characterization of garnishing creditor in Chapter 13); Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federal-
ism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063 (2002); Raleigh v. I11. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
iO7See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, UCC Article Nine Revised: Priorities, Preferences, and Liens Effective
Only in Bankruptcy, 82 NEB. L. REV. 607 (2004); Karen Gross, A Response to J.J. White's Death and
Resurrection of Secured Credit: Finding Some Trees But Missing the Forest, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
203, 216 (2004) (noting role of changes in Article 9 in enhancing secured creditor power in bankruptcy);
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney Jr., Revised Article 9 Meets the Bankruptcy Code: Policy and
Impact, 9 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85 (2001); Edward J. Janger, The Reliance Interest in Insolvency Law:
A Reply to Harris and Mooney, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1895 (2004); Margit Livingston, Survey of Cases
Decided under Revised Article 9: There's Not Much New Under the Sun, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. LJ. 47,
48 (2003) ("many of the revisions seemed geared toward allowing secured creditors an easier time in
bankruptcy"); G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revising Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 3 (2001).
i"'Compare Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002, H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. § 102 ("Durbin-Dela-
hunt") (authorizing court recharacterization of transactions) with Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420,
107th Cong. § 912 (2001); H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001) (insulating transactions from recharacter-
ization). See generally Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
301 (2002).
1°9See, e.g., STEPHEN L. SCHWARCZ, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LiSSA L. BROOME, SECURITIZATION,
STRUCTURED FINANCE, AND CAPITAL MARKETS 76 (2004) (discussing state law efforts to preempt
Bankruptcy Code). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A (2004); Ronald J. Mann, The Rise of State
Bankruptcy-Directed Legislation, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1805 (2004); Edward J. Janger, The Death of Se-
cured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1759 (2004). See also OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (2004);
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state statutes characterizing consumer rent-to-own arrangements essentially
require full payment by Chapter 13 filers who wish to retain the property.110
To be sure, lobbying state legislatures is not easy. The examples men-
tioned above involved highly coordinated and probably well-funded ef-
forts. 11' Preemption concerns are omnipresent.' 12 Nonetheless, state law is a
potent additive to bankruptcy and inherently is part of bankruptcy reform.
Even if federal legislation remains the ideal, a state statute can be an impor-
tant first step; members of Congress may perceive a state law as a model for
federal legislation."
13
D. THE NEWS MEDIA
For those who are unconvinced that the system can grow and develop
regardless of Congressional action or inaction, this section discusses a way to
be involved indirectly with the federal legislative process: experts may be
able to affect perceptions of a legal system and policy developments through
interactions with the news media. The media help set the policy agenda and
frame debates in ways that mobilize public opinion and lead to particular
types of solutions. 1 4 To the extent news reporters -co-produce" policy,"
5
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-1-10(3) (2003); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(e) (2004) ("For all
purposes, in the absence of fraud or intentional misrepresentation, the parties' characterization of a transac-
tion as a sale of such assets shall be conclusive that the transaction is a sale and is not a secured transaction
and that title, legal and equitable, has passed to the party characterized as the purchaser of those assets
regardless of whether the secured party has any recourse against the debtor, whether the debtor is entitled
to any surplus, or any other term of the parties' agreement."); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-473 (2004). See
generally Jeffrey M. Carbino & William H. Schorling, Delaware's Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act:
Will the Act Prevent the Recharacterization of a Sale of Receivables in a Seller's Bankruptcy?, 6 DEL. L.
REV. 367 (2003).
"'°See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.952 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1351.01 (2004); VA.
CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.18 (2004). See generally Barkley Clark et al., "Rent-to-Own" Agreements in Bank-
ruptcy: Sales or Leases?, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 115, 118 (1994) (reporting that thirty-six states have
adopted legislation regulating rental-purchase agreements, and that most courts honor state court defini-
tions of these agreements). But see THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW PRO,
JECT 164 (1997) (noting that most bankruptcy courts have treated transactions as installment sales, and
advocating Bankruptcy Code amendment to trump state law characterizations).
11.On the other hand, some types of state legislative efforts can be quite effective without a nationally
coordinated effort. For example, the bar association of a single state may develop proposed changes to
state exemption statutes.
ii'See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, The Rise of State Bankruptcy-Directed Legislation, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1805 (2004). For preemption problems in the closely related area of banking, see, e.g., Robert C. Eager &
C.F. Muckenfuss, III, Federal Preemption and the Challenge to Maintain Balance in the Dual Banking
System, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 21 (2004).
ii'See, e.g., Center For Responsible Lending Policy Brief No. 6, Miller, Watt, and Others Sponsor Anti-
Predatory Lending Legislation Based on Landmark North Carolina Solution (Mar. 2004) (explaining that
"H.R. 3974 draws on North Carolina's landmark 1999 law").
14
See generally KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & PAUL WALDMAN, THE PRESS EFFECT: POLITICIANS,
JOURNALISTS, AND THE STORIES THAT SHAPE THE POLITICAL WORLD 122 (2003); Everett M. Rogers et
al., A Paradigmatic History of Agenda-Setting Research, in Do THE MEDIA GOVERN? (Shanto Iyengar &
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experts may wish to attempt co-producing news reporting.
Just as they did not set Congress's agenda, bankruptcy experts did not
substantially participate in the framing of media reporting on bankruptcy in
the mid-to-late 1990s.116 Some bankruptcy experts (particularly Elizabeth
Richard Reeves, eds., 1997); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF NEWS 35 (2003); Deborah A.
Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. Sci. Q. 281 (1989).
1
5 See, e.g., TIMOTHY E. CooK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS 3, 10-13 (1998) (political actors and
journalists 'interact in constant but implicit series of negotiations over who controls agenda"); STEPHEN
HESS, LIVE FROM CAPITOL HILL: STUDIES OF CONGRESS AND THE MEDIA (1991); M. ETHAN KATSH,
LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 9 (1995) (law and media 'intimately linked institutions"); SIDNEY KRAUS &
DENNIS DAVIS, THE EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION ON POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1976) (centrality
of media to policymaking, particularly since rise of television imagery); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE SOCIOL-
OGY OF NEWS 21 (2003) (politicians as parajournalists); Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Custom?, in UNITED
STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers & George Nolte,
eds. 2003) (media as source of public conscience, playing role in policymaking); Frank R. Baumgartner et
al., Media Attention and Congressional Agendas, in Do THE MEDIA GOVERN? POLITICIANS, VOTERS,
AND REPORTERS IN AMERICA 350 (Shanto Iyengar & Richard Reeves, eds., 1997) ("[slometimes one leads
and sometimes the other, and often both are following actions of some third party"); Robert H. Giles, The
Media and Government Regulation in the Great Tradition of Muckraking, 11 K~AN. J.L. PuB. POL'Y 567,
570 (2002) ("news plays a formative role in the development of policy, of legislation, of regulations, of
reform and in the overlay of politics that is so characteristic of our contemporary democracy"); Jan Ellen
Rein, Misinformation and Self-Deception in Recent Long-Term Care Policy Trends, 12 J.L. & POL. 195,
234 (1996) ("profound effect on policy decisions at every level of government"); Lucy A. Williams, Race,
Rat Bites, and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM
URB. LJ. 1159, 1174 (1995) (media imaging affecting poverty and welfare legislation).
"'Individual bankruptcy experts did not get cited with particular regularity or consistency in the
national press. Focusing only on law professors in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall
Street Journal between September 1, 1997 and August 30, 2001, for example, fewer than ten academics
other than Elizabeth Warren were cited at all, and even then, they were cited only one to three times.
The late Professor Lawrence King was cited shortly before his death, in clear opposition to the bill, in the
New York Times. Peter T. Kilborn, Mired in Debt and Seeking a Path Out, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 2001,
§ 1, at 1 (most filers have job problems of no fault of their own or something else that "throws their lives
out of kilter"); Philip Shenon, How Bill in Senate Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of Debt, N.Y. TIMES,
March 14, 2001, at Al ('I fear this will end up creating an underground economy .... In my 40 years of
dealing with Congress on bankruptcy legislation, this is the worst I've ever seen .... It's the kind of bill
that makes you want to point your fingers at individual congressmen and say, 'Shame on you.'"). Professor
Todd Zywicki was cited favoring the legislation. Riva D. Atlas, Bankruptcy Bill Tightens Rules For
Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2001, at CI (defending absolute limit on time for assumption of non-
residential lease); Peter T. Kilborn, Mired in Debt and Seeking a Path Out, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 2001, at
§ 1, at 1 (most filers are legitimate but "there are large numbers who are not legitimate users. The bill
eliminates the forms of abuse that are out there."); Philip Shenon, How Bill in Senate Would Add Hurdles
to Erasing of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 2001, at Al ("no good reason why a schoolteacher earning
$30,000 a year should have to pay more for a mortgage or more for a new couch because some guy making
$100,000 a year finds it inconvenient to pay his debts"). Professors David Skeel and Jay Lawrence West-
brook were cited in connection with their books, although one of Skeel's citations is borderline critical of
the bill. David Frum, What Happens When the Money Runs Out, WALL ST. J., August 24, 2000, at A20
(reviewing the THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS co-authored by Westbrook); Robert Samuelson, Bad Timing
on the Bankruptcy Bill, WASH. POST, March 14, 2001, at A25 (citing Skeel for history of Chapters 7 and
13); David Wessel, The Muddled Course of Bankruptcy Law, WALL ST. J., February 22, 2001, at Al
(legislation discourages filings by raising cost). Then Professor, now Judge Bruce Markell was cited twice:
once about creditor practices and once about proponents' motivation for the bill. Caroline E. Mayer,
Night of the Living Debt; Discharged Bills Come Back-Often Illegally-to Haunt Bankruptcy Filers,
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Warren) eventually helped the media frame bankruptcy as a story of industry
power and influence, as a story of loopholes for the rich, and as a women's
and children's issue. 117 As reporters and editorial pages spoke more critically
about bankruptcy through the lens of these universal themes, 1is the bill sput-
tered and stalled on several occasions. The omnibus bill did not become
much better, but it also did not become law. I cannot prove causation, but
close study of the reporting and legislative activities suggests interaction con-
sistent with the media-related literature. An affirmative and earlier media
strategy-before an omnibus bill was even introduced -could have made an
even greater impact on Congressional receptiveness and enthusiasm.
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CONCLUSION
Some judges tell us that "the Code is the law."" 9 Bankruptcy experts
tend to internalize that message and then conceptualize system improvements
in terms of Bankruptcy Code amendment. Many statutory changes were
suggested to or discussed with the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
via more than 2300 written submissions and 600 in-person contributions,12
0
and much of the 1028 page majority report discussed proposed statutory
amendments.' 2 ' Law professors and others regularly write articles proposing
Code amendments as the answer.122 The National Bankruptcy Conference
developed two lengthy reports recommending Code revisions. 23 It is not
surprising that one would shudder at the thought of being excluded from
Congressional deliberations.
Much is at stake in a discussion about the direction of the bankruptcy
system. The bankruptcy system affects many millions of individuals, families,
firms, and communities. 24 The system intersects with a staggering range of
substantive issues: the bankruptcy system encounters families being sued for
119Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 585 (3d
Cir. 2003) (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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1 'See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION (1997).
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the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 173, 209 (2000) ('And those of us who comment on the bankruptcy system are not free from
blame either. We dribble out an endless series of articles saying this particular case or that is wrong and
call for an instant legislative fix."). The American Bankruptcy Law Journal itself dedicated many volumes
to criticisms and proposals. See, e.g., Symposium, Letters to the Commission, 69 AM. BANKR. LJ.431
(1995); Symposium, Reforming Consumer Bankruptcy Law; Four Proposals, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431
(1997).
12'THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW PROJECT, REFORMING THE BANK-
RUPTCY CODE (May 1, 1994); THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW PROJECT,
REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (Rev'd May 1, 1997).
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4See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION 722 (1997) ("The pre-
sent bankruptcy system comes into contact with more individuals and entities and handles more money
than the rest of the federal court system combined."); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy
Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995) ("No corner of our society seems immune
from the ubiquitous reach of bankruptcy. It touches mass tort victims, mega corporations, mom-and-pop
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als-the list is endless."); Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR.
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national relevance. 2004 Democratic National Platform Committee Report, 22 (2004) (noting that one of
seven middle class families may be bankrupt by the end of the decade). This mention of bankruptcy does
not include any mention of Democrats'- particularly New Democrat or "Blue Dogs"-support for the
omnibus bill. See Press Release, New Democrat Coalition, New Democrats Provide Key Support for
Bankruptcy Reform (March 1, 2001), available at http://www.ndol.org/print.cfm?contentid=31 11; Press
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medical debts,125 an Archdiocese defending against sexual abuse allega-
tions, 1 26 major manufacturers of products that allegedly have caused wide-
spread harm, 127 and small businesses fighting with the IRS, 128 all while the
debtors have responsibilities to a wider range of claim or interest holders.
Bankruptcy offers a collective approach to working through these and other
problems. 
129
This system is too vast and too significant to be left in the hands of any
one group, including bankruptcy experts. But believing that bankruptcy ex-
perts can be shut out of reform not only is counterproductive, but impossible.
Bankruptcy experts know the system is not perfect, and do not speak with
one voice regarding its ideal direction. But even if they did, they know that
no version of the Code would capture it .130 The Bankruptcy Code's birthday
should be celebrated with the recognition that the Code's role in this vast
and complex system is important but not all-encompassing. Twenty-five
years from now, even if the Bankruptcy Code is largely the same, the bank-
ruptcy system will have been remade again.
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